The Battle of Manzikert 1 in 463 /1071 is an important land-mark in history in so far as it resulted in two important processes-the gradual settlement of the Turks in Asia Minör (along with the Islamisation of the heart-lands of Byzantium), and the beginning of a Byzantine desire to open its territories to western European powers for the launching of the Crusades. The causes of the battle are equally important. First of ali, there was the constant conflict between Byzantium and the central Müslim power, aggravated by the arrival of Turkish tribes and the rise of the Saljüqs in the eleventh century. Second, the Armenian territories played a significant role in providing a setting for this conflict. But one aspect of Manzikert which has never been emphasized, though not altogether neglected, is the active Fâtimid foreign policy connected with frustrating the rise of the Saljüqs in the East. It is this last aspect which I wish to isolate for discussion in the following pages, not so much to contribute new information as to furnish a re-interpretation indicating possible Fâtimid machinations behind the Battle of Manzikert. Zubayr against Yazîd, Marwân and 'Abd al-Malik, the period of the changeover from the Umayyad to 'Abbâsid rule and the involvement of the 'Abbâsid Caliphate with provincial and central Amırs. Second, despite the war, the rulers of Byzantium and islam had numerous occasions to exchange gifts and courtesies and to promote commercial pursuits. 13 Third, both the Müslim gljâzîs and the Byzantine akrites believed in the necessity of a holy war, a doctrine which was generated by centuries of incessant conflict, making it difficult for any Müslim ruler to declare alliance or friendship with Byzantium. One could manage, however, with a truce. Moreover, there was never a wholesale crusade or jihâd but fighting for border fortresses and booty. Such a situation was not desperate. It became so only in the eleventh, when the great flood of Turkish tribes began to spill över Asia Minör. A similar movement of the Arab bedouin tribes (the Hilâli migration) was sweeping över North Africa at about the same time, and we shall see the connection between the two presently.
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that could be noted here. The Müslim war against Byzantium was continuous and was only interrupted in times of civil war, as for example during the wars of Ridda, the war between 'Ali and Mu'âwiya, the war of 'Abd Allah b. Zubayr against Yazîd, Marwân and 'Abd al-Malik, the period of the changeover from the Umayyad to 'Abbâsid rule and the involvement of the 'Abbâsid Caliphate with provincial and central Amırs. Second, despite the war, the rulers of Byzantium and islam had numerous occasions to exchange gifts and courtesies and to promote commercial pursuits. 13 Third, both the Müslim gljâzîs and the Byzantine akrites believed in the necessity of a holy war, a doctrine which was generated by centuries of incessant conflict, making it difficult for any Müslim ruler to declare alliance or friendship with Byzantium. One could manage, however, with a truce. Moreover, there was never a wholesale crusade or jihâd but fighting for border fortresses and booty. Such a situation was not desperate. It became so only in the eleventh, when the great flood of Turkish tribes began to spill över Asia Minör. A similar movement of the Arab bedouin tribes (the Hilâli migration) was sweeping över North Africa at about the same time, and we shall see the connection between the two presently.
The Turkish tribes and the Rise of the Saljüqs:
Turks had played an important part in Middle Eastern politics before the advent of the Saljüqs 14 and even constituted independant dynasties such as the Ikhshîdids. The Arab scholar Jâhiz devoted a Risâla to their praise. 15 But with them we are not concerned here. The advent of the Turkish tribes in the eleventh century was epoch-making and the subject is discussed at length by Cahen in two articles, 16 also previously by Laurent 17 and Mukrimin
Halil. 18 The tribes mentioned are: the Qînlq, from whom the Saljüqs were derived (on the authority of Mahmüd Kâshgharî and the Malik-nâma); the Döger in the Kurdish region, to whom belonged the later day Artüqids (on the authority of Yardan and Jazarî); the salghür, who gave their name to a 12th century dynasty in Fârs, but arrived early alongside with the Saljüqs (on the authority of the 16th century Shlrâz-nâma); the Ivâll in the Adjıerbaijan-Armenian region who figüre at the end of the 12th century when under the name of Yârüql they were transplanted near Aleppo by the Zangî (on the authority of I. Ath, Râwandî, Tmâd ad-Dîn and Nasawî, but Cahen thinks they came early in the eleventh century); the Avshâr, who were a significant tribe in Khüzistân region in the late 12th century (on the authority of Köprülü's article Avşar in the Turkish Encycl. of islam, but Cahen thinks they arrived earlier). More relevant to our story are the tribes that entered Anatolia. Yâzijı-Oghlü (ed. Houtsma) repeatedly mentions the Qai, the Bâycit, the Bayundür and the Sdlür (Salghür) but Cahen eliminates the information on the ground that they figured much later and that Yâzijı mentioned them as a matter of style since these peoples were the four pillars of Saljüq power. We are not concerned here with the Aghatsheri (mentioned by Bar Habraeus, Ibn Bibi, Ibn Shaddâd ete.) which belong to a much later Mongol period.
The one tribe that figured early in Anatolia, that remained in Anatolia (settled later in the northwest region) and that played a part in the events prior to the Battle of Manzikert was called variously the Nâvüki, Yâvuki, Nârü-ki or Bciduki (because in the Arabic letter "n" the change of dots would result in "y", or "b"; whereas "r" and "v" could also be confused). Cahen has pointed out, however, that the name could come from the Khwarazmian Nav-qi (Tribus, p. 186). The Saljüqs, it is well known, had settled in Kvwarazmian territory before their occupation of Khurâsân, and that Chaglıri and Tughril had married a Khwarazmian lady. (Same) Tughril's sister Jawhar Khâtûn was married to Arlsıghl 19 21 has a chapter on Khwarazm where he repeatedly talks of two Turkish families or tribes who had come to that area, viz. Saljüqiyân and Yinâliyân. It is generally accepted that Ibrâ-hlm Yinâl was a half-brother of Tughril and therefore the separate identity of the Yinâlî is ignored. But it appears that the Yinâlı were just as much a separate group as the Nâvukı, connected by marriage with the Saljüqs, and like the latter entered Anatolia and claimed to be the Mawâlî Amîr al-Mu'-mînin (the clients of the Caliph). 22 They are also referred to as Yaghmûriân, 
27
(iv) Yûsuf (or Yûnus) is also the father of Arısighl mentioned above, according to one version. 28 It is quite possible that there were several individuals ealled Yûsuf, and that this is the cause of confusion among our sources. Synthesising the genealogy, 29 Cahen arrives at: ibrahim b. Yûsuf Yinâl b. Mûsa b.
Seljûq, which would place him a generation below Tughril and would not in that case make him his half brother. The purpose in going into this discussion here has been to maintain that Yinâliya were a separate tribal group. 30 Two factors bear this out: Bayhaqî's referring to them as separate from Saljûqs and the word Yînâl applied to both ibrahim and his father Yûsuf, as a group or tribal designation. We will notice later Ibrâhîm's initial support to Tughril and later defiance of him, in collusion with the Fâtimids. Many of these tribes that flooded Asia Minör from the east belonged to the Oghuz Turkic confederation, who are called by the Arabic sources Ghuzz. However, there were other tribes of the Ghuzz that had descended on Byzantium from the north and on the Balkan frontiers since 1065. These were known to Byzantine historians 31 as Uzes. Charanis 32 says, "The Uzes are merely the Oghuz in Byzantine form, but the distinction is useful in separating those who crossed the Russian steppe from those who crossed the Persian plateau." The Ghuzz, however, were not the first Turkish tribes that Byzantium had to cope with. Since the ninth century thousands of Pechenegs (or Patzinaks) 33 and Kumans had crossed the Danube into Byzantine territory and it took much tact and diplomacy by that state to keep them in check.
A distinction has been made by Cahen 34 between the autonomous Turkish tribes and those under the control of the Saljüq sultâns -the former were predatory, the latter disciplined regular army; the former had plunder, booty and ransom in miııd, the latter pursued political ends. But the distinction is very thin. How can we classify ibrahim Yinâl's raids in Armenia of 440/1048 as predatory and Tughril's campaign of 446/1054 as regular?
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Again how can we make a distinction between the activities of Arlsîghl, leader of the Navükîya and those of Sultân Alp Arslân's protege Afshîn, both prior to the Battle of Manzikert? 36 Booty and ransom-money formed an important item in the Sultân's budget and was used for political purposes. But the more important factor is that of migration. The Middle East was overflowing with newly arrived Turkish tribes, who may have been nomadic to begin with but were definitely in search of a new home and not just grazing grounds for their animals. Their rapaciousness was only a passing phase. The ethnic-religious opposition of both the Fâtimid and the Byzantine states emanated not from fear of the Turks as such, but from the fear of the settlement of this new element. The eagerness of the 'Abbâsid invitation to the Saljüqs was not so
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much a result of the love of orthodoxy as a result of the desperation stemming from their conflict with the Fâtimids.
'Abbâsid invitation to the Saljüqs.
The early history of the Saljüqs-their tribal origin and settlement in Khwârazım, conversion to islâm, Sâmânid and Qârâkhânid service, hostility to the Gljaznavids leading to the Battle of Dandanaqân with them in 431 / 1040 has been related by Cahen (in his article Malik-Nameh and book Turkey) where four different traditions in muslim sources are examined: (i) the early Persian historians of the Ghaznavids, mainly GardızI (ca. 441 /1050) and Bayhaqî (d. 470/1077); (ii) the Bagfedâdi historians Ibn al-Jawzî (d. 597/1200) and Sibt b. al-Jawzı (d. 654 /1256) (iii) the Persian work Malik-Nameh (lost) which was the basis of 'Imâd ad-Din's (d. 560/1164) account (although not acknowledged) whieh in turn was the basis of Bundarı's abridgement (with acknowledgment). Malik-Nameh was followed in the 7th/13th century work Zubdat at-Tawârlkh whieh in turn was followed by Ibn al-Athîr (d. 631 /1233) without acknowledgment. The Malik-Nameh tradition is also embodied in the works of Bar Habraeus (7th/13th cent.) and Mirkhwand (d. 904/1498) (iv) the Saljüqnâma of Zahir ad-DIn Nishâpürî (6th /12th century) which follows a tradition independent of Malik-nâmeh and is followed by Râwandı (end of the 6th /12th century). Cahen's summaries have been succinctly stated in English by Kouymjian in his article (1969) on Mixit'ar of Ani. The details of these works will be found in the bibliographical index attached. Restatement of this early Saljüq history is not necessary as it is only remotely relevant here.
We pass on, then, to the 'Abbâsid interest in inviting the Saljüqs. Since 336/946 the"Abbâsid Caliphate had come under the tutelage of the Buwayhid Amîrs. The Sünni Caliphate had been incongruously adjusted to a Twelver Shî'î political authority but together they shared a common rivalry with the new Sy'I Ismâ'îlı dynasty of North Africa-the Fâtimids. However, the increasing power of the Fâtimids (for in the first half of the 5th/llth century they also controlled Egypt, Syria and the countries bordering on the Red Sea, and had their Khutba read at Mecca and Medina) and the weakening of the Buwayhids by internal dissensions and military revolts, had created for the 'Abbâsid Caliphs a danger as well as an opportunity. The opportunity increased with the rise of such stalwarts as Mahmüd of Ghazna and later Tughril Beg in the East; and the danger decreased because of the chaos in which Egypt had been plunged by an eccentric Caliph al-Hâkim (386-411/996-1201).
Two measures that the 'Abbâsid Caliph al-Qâdir (381-422/991-1031) adopted were of far-reaching significance-the issuance of a manifesto against the Fâtimid origin of the Fâtimid Caliphs in 402/1011 37 In 431 /1040, the Battle of Dandanaqân was fought against the Ghaznawid Mas'üd, who was defeated and had to abandon Khurâsân finally to the Saljüqs. 48 In 434 /1042 Ibrâhım Yinâl entered Rayy followed there by Tughril. Again the purposes of the mission of Qâdi Mâwardı can be inferred from the events that soon followed, namely the stepping up of pressure on. 55 However, this army was defeated and Liparites taken prisoner. The
Emperor was obliged to send a mission to Tughril (led by the former's secretary, Giorgios Drosos, in 442 /1050) which demanded and got the release of Liparites, and which promised to have the Khutba read in the mosque of Constantinople in the name of the Sultân. 56 Laurent doubts that it was ever done. 57 The Marwânid prince of Diyâr-Bekir, Naşr ad-Dawla, who vas in the Byzantine sphere of influence did read the Khutba for Tughril; 58 and so did the Rawwâdid prince Wahsüdân at Tabrız and the Shâddâdid prince Abu'l-Aswâr at Ganja. In the same year Mu'izz asked Baghdâd for official investiture. Caliph Qâ'im's envoy Abü Ghâlib ash-Shirâzî was sent with an 'Abbâsid robe of honor, a black Standard and gifts. The envoy arrived at Constantinople seeking permission to pass through to Qayrawân. But the Emperor Constantine was treaty-bound with the Fâtimids, and on request from Cairo, he re-routed the Bagljdâd embassy via Cairo. In Cairo, the envoy was humiliated and paraded on a camel; the papers of investiture, presents and the black Standard were burned in the Bayn al-Qasrayn. Tughril Beg in the meantime had personally appeared at Constantinople asking permission to march across the Byzantine territory to Egypt, but was not allowed to do so. The 'Abbâsid envoy was returned to Constantinople. 64 ¥e have brought the narrative down to the year 443 /1051. To Maqrîzî we owe the unique information about Tughril's presence near Constantinople in this year, probably taking advantage of the treaty made with the Emperor in the previous year (when Liparites was released). An interesting fact that emerges is the tactics of creating dissension between the Fâtimids and Byzantium in order to spoil a good relationship that had existed throughout the early part of the eleventb century. With the relationship contaminated, it ¥e know that Tughril was awarded the title of "Rukn ad-D!n" by the 'Abbâsid Caliph in 443/1051, after he received the treasures unearthed by Tughril at Işfahân on its conquest. 65 The coins of Nishâpur of this year bear this title. 66 He also received later, on his entry into Baghdâd, the title "King of the East and the West", 67 but the import of this title had already been in evidence much before. He was already the King of the East, and was encouraged by the 'Abbâsid Caliph to become also the King of the West (by occupying the territories of the Byzantine and the Fâtimid States). Probably this was the understanding arrived at in Qâdı Mâwardî's embassies to Tughril as early as 434/1042 and 435/1063.
We must interrupt the narrative here, to examine the situation in the west.
Fâtimid-Byzantine relations.
Qâdi'n-Nu'mân (d. 363/974) 68 There is a long list of the historians of Egypt, prominent among them being Ibn Taghribîrdi, Dawâdârî, Ibn Qalqashandî and Dhahabî, who usually are useful for corroborating the evidence of earlier writers.
On Byzantine embassies, a basic reference-work is Dölger's Regesten (see index), full of information on treaties, truces, envoys, exchanges of gifts, ransoms, tributes ete. with documentation from original sources, Müslim and Byzantine, and from basic modern studies.
We have four general histories of the Fâtimid period, by Wustenfeld, Lane-Poole, O'Leary and Zahid Ali. Of these only the last one has used Fâ-timid-Ismâlli sources, but as his work is in Urdu it is little used. (See index for the titles).
Byzantium had every reason to look upon the establishment of the Fâ-timid Caliphate in North Africa in 297/909 with favor, for it opposed the "Abbâsid Caliphate and had just defeated the Aghlabids of Qayrawân who had caused the Byzantine State much grief by their occupation of Sieily and other Mediterranean islands. Byzantine hopes were frustrated, however, because the Fâtimids insisted on retaining their Mediterranean heritage from the Aghlabids. But in so far as they could divert the attack of the eastern Caliphate, their friendship was to be hoped for and to this end Byzantine policy was directed. Not always did the Fâtimids oblige, for they were keen on presenting an image of Islamic leadership untarnished by a friendship with this non-muslim power. The King of Bulgars sent emissaries to Mahdi for an alliance against Byzantium. Mahdı sent his envoys in return but while erossing the Mediterranean, they were captured by Byzantine ships. However, the Emperor Romanus Lecapenus released them and the Fâtimid Caliph in a return gesture reduced by half the annual tribute paid to Sieily. 73 The next Caliph Qâ'im instructed his General Ya'qüb b. Ishâq at-Tamîmi to raid the southern coast of France and the Italian coast of Genoa and Calabria. 74 The city of Genoa was occupied. 75 Crete, Corsica, Malta and Cyprus followed suit, although only for a short while. In fact according to Ibn Khal- 86 This resulted in the signing of a peace treaty in 356 /967 between the two powers. 87 The very next year Nicephoros sent another mission demanding the release of the Patriarch Niketas taken prisoner in Sicily. This resulted in an anti-Baghdâd Pact.
88
With its conquest of Egypt in 358/969, the Fâtimid State developed a new frontier with Byzantium, in Syria, and gradually reverted to peaceful commercial relationships in the Mediterranean, with Amalfi, near Naples as its window to the West. 89 Syrian politics brought many complications. Besides
Byzantium and tbe 'Abbâsids on its frontiers, there was the eternal problem of the Arab bedouin tribes (the Hilâlians) influenced by the dissident Qarmatian creed and ali it d to Turkish soldiers of fortune under Alptegin (Aftakin, Alaftakin, Haftakin). Byzantium under John Tzimisces supported Alptegîn an feared the Fâtimid advance in Syria. 90 Basil II had acceded to the Byzantine throne in 976 and was to rule until 1025, a period that saw a revival of Byzantine power and prestige abroad. 
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In three missions in quick succession he settled his southern front. The first was a letter to Baglıdâd in 371 /979 protesting against 'Adud ad-Dawla's support and refuge to a rebel; 91 the second was to S a'd ad-Dawla the Hamdânid ruler of Aleppo in 376 /988 obligating him to a tribute to be paid according to a treaty that was signed; 92 the third was to the new Fâtimid Caliph al-'Aziz in 377 /987 with lavish gifts. It was agreed that 'Aziz would be prayed for in the mosque at Constantinople as the rightful Caliph of islam and that he would undertake the restoration of the Church of Holy Sepulchre at Jerusalem. 93 These missions put the Byzantine foreign policy, as had existed for a long time, in clear perspective-they needed to cultivate Fâtimid friendship and use it against their common foe, Baghdâd. They also needed peace with the Hamdânids of Aleppo for the security of their frontier.
'Aziz solved the southern Syrian problem by defeating the Qarmatians and the Turks of Alptegin. The Qarmatians retired permanently with a promise of tribute; the Hilâlian tribes transplanted from Syria and settled in southern Egypt; Alptegin was brought to Cairo as prisoner but was taken into Fâtimid service and put in charge of a newly formed Turkish guard. The veteran wazîr Ya'qüb b. Killîs was opposed to this, had Alptegin killed, and was himself removed from office, but was later reinstated. In Palestine, a Jarrâhid governor Mufarrij b. Daghfal remained a real trouble-maker. 94 When Caliph 'Aziz visited the dying wazlr Ibn Killîs, the latter gave him this advice: "O, Commander of the Faithful, keep peace \vith Byzantium, when they keep peace with you; keep the Hamdânids satisfied by constant contact (da'wa and sikka, thus recognising their autonomy) but do not let al-Mufarrij b. Daghfal b. al-Jarrâh remain, whenever there is an opportunity to do so." 95 After Ibn Killîs's death in 380 /990 the advice was not heeded; fresh hostilities opened with Byzantium and continued till after the accession of Hâ-kim. The main reason for this was the Emperor Basil's pressure on Aleppo. From now on, Aleppo was destined to remain the focal point of a triangular conflict between the three powers -Fâtimid, 'Abbâsid and Byzantine, till the Battle of Manzikert which itself developed from politics involving Aleppo".
The Fâtimid governor of Damascus, Manjutakin, laid siege to Aleppo in 382/992. Basil hastened to its relief and from there proceeded to Apamea, Antioch and Tripoli, but returned from there to Tarsus and Constantinople. In the meantime Byzantine vessels were eruising near Alexandria. But the return of the Emperor shows that he was not seriously intending to march on Egypt. 96 In 387/997, the year after 'Azlz's death there was an uprising of sailors at Tyre, fomented by Byzantium; however, the Fâtimid commander Jaysh was able to put it down after defeating a Byzantine force at Apamea. 97 With the accession of Caliph Hâkim, a new era of long truces with Byzantium begins. Hâkim's administrator Barjwân approached Basil for a truce and the emperor welcomed the idea. A ten years, truce was agreed upon in 388 /998. 98 A similar truce was also made by Basil with Ibn Marwân, the Amir of Diyâr Bekir. 99 Exactly during the years of this truce Hâkim enacted many discriminatory ordinances against Christians and Jews in his realm. In 399 /1009 the Church of the Holy Sepulchre at Jerusalem was ordered to be demolished. 100 This is considered as one of the provocations for the Crusades.
However it was not viewed by Byzantium so seriously. At the most, commercial relations with Egypt were broken off by Basil in 406 /1015 only temporarily. In 412 /1021 shortly before Hâkim's death attempts at reconciliation were made. 101 Byzantine diplomacy was shrewd enough to understand that Hâkim's many acts of discrimination were not a result of hostility but of mental aberration; that they were directed not only toward Christians but also toward Muslims, and that they were never consistent, since periods of great favour to the religious minorities alternated with periods of discrimination. It must be remembered that in 402 /1011, the 'Abbâsid Manifesto launched a majör anti-Fâtimid propaganda campaign at the initiative of the 'Abbâsid Caliph Qâdir. This was no time for hostility between the Fâtimids and Byzantium. which the Emperor agreed to return ali prisoners, to have Zâhir's name prayed for at the Mosque of Constantinople, to have the mosque itself repaired and have a müezzin appointed. In return the Caliph agreed to restore the Church of Holy Sepulchre at Jerusalem, to let the Emperor appoint the Patriarch of Jerusalem and to facilitate the return to Christianity of Christians converted by force to islam. 102 In Syria and Palestine, Byzantium no longer challenged Fâtimid suzerainty över Ascalon, Tripoli, Acre, Tyre, Ramla, Jerusalem and Damascus, while the Fâtimids recognised Byzantine control över Antioch. Aleppo had a nominal Fâtimid sovereignty, but was actually independent under the Mirdâsids, and was truce-bound with Byzantium.
In 427/1034 Zâhir was succeeded by his 8-year old son Mustanşir as Caliph. But the power rested with the latter's Südâni mother Sitt al-Mulk. By 429 /1036 it was time for the third ten year truce. On June 13 a pact was made by Emperor Micheal V with Sitt al-Mulk. 5,000 Müslim prisoners were released, and Egypt agreed to undertake new construction at the Church of the Holy Sepulchre. 103 Again after ten years and with perfect regularity the Byzantine Emperor Constantine MonomachoSs mission arrived in 439 /1047 with gifts for the renewal of the previous treaty. 104 We have noted in the previous section that by now the Saljüq power was well established in Khurâsân and Persia, and that the Turkomans were already raiding deep into the Byzantine mainland. The Emperor had sent a mission to Tughril Beg in 447/1050 for the release of Liparites taken prisoner in the earlier encounter with Ibrâhim Yinâl in 440 /1048. W e have also noted Tughril's appearance at Constantinople in 443/1057 demanding passage through Byzantine territory for an invasion of Egypt and the Byzantine intervention in getting the 'Abbâsid envoy to the North African Amîr Mu'izz released from Egyptian imprisonment. We have further noted the Fâtimid reaction to Saljüq -Zîrî entente which resulted in the unleashing of the Bedouin Hilâlian Arab tribes över North Africa. In 446/1052, the '-Abbâsid Caliph had re-issued the Manifesto about the origin of the Fâtimids, and Maqrîzî says this was in connection with the 'Abbâsid North African policy. 105 Further understanding of Byzantine-Fâtimid relations can only be obtained by recognizing tbeir confrontation with the Saljüq-'Abbâsid state.
Fâtimid-Saljüq Confrontation:
To the list of sources discussed in the previous section, one extremely important Fâtimid source will now have to be added. It is the autobiography 106 of a Fâtimid dâ'I Mu ayyad fi'd-Dîn ash-Shlrâzî (387-470 /997-1077).
Mu'ayyad was a Daylami Persian, brought up in the Persian Isma'Ilî tradition.
He was posted at the court of the Büyid king Abü Kâlîjâr at Shirâz, was on good terms with his wazîr Bahrâm b. Mâfanna and hostile to the local Qâdı who took orders from Ibn al-Muslima, the Ra'Is ar-Ru'asa at Baghdâd. Mu'-ayyad had watched the advent of the Saljüqs in Persia at close quarters and had opposed it. In 429 /1037 he was forced out of Shîrâz by pressure from Baghdâd. For nearly ten years he wandered among the city-states of Syria, and we find him in Egypt by 439 /1047. In whatever capacity he served the Fâtimid State, he remained their specialist on Syrian and eastern affairs. In 448 /1056 he was sent back to Syria as a roving ambassador to the various Syrian Amîrs, trying to ünite them in a common effort to stop Tughril Beg taking över the 'Abbâsid State and administration. He forged links with Basâsîrî who was responsible for 1 the Fâtimid Khutba at Baghdad in 450-51/ 1058, and also with Ibrâhîm Yînâl who was responsible for a dangerous revolt against Tughril. He has related ali these experiences in his Slra which is rare also because it is one of the very few autobiographies in Medieval islam. Mu'ayyad's Dîwön contains some verses relevant to our discussion, particularly to the attempt to form a Fâtimid-Büyid entente to prevent the coming of the Saljüqs. For the later Büyid court we have Ibn al-Balkhî's Fârsnâma (composed between 500/1106 to 510/1116).
In 435 /1043, the Büyid Amir Abü Tâhir Jalâl ad-Dawla died and the Khutba was read for the next Büyid Amir Abü Kâlijâr at Baghdâd. The situation was precarious. The Caliph seemed to manage two Khutbas at Baghdâd, a i Büyid one, officially and unwillingly; and a Saljüq one, unofficially and willingly. It was a matter of time before Tughril would arrive in Baghdâd and oust the Böyids. Men like Ibn al-Muslima and the Qâdi Mâwardi were keeping the Saljüq interests in Baghdâd intact. At this time, the Ghuzz were active in Anatolia, Qarmisın and Mosul. Tughril himself embarked on an extensive raid in Byzantium that took him as far as Erzerüm. This was in 446 /1054. 107 Before this time the Byzantine Emperor Constantine Monomachos had the Patriarch write to the Pope Leo IX in 1053, appealing for peace between the Churches. 108 Such approaches were to continue later till the coming of the Crusades. At the moment, it was in the immediate context of the fear of Turkoman raids.
Tughril's arrival at Erzerüm coincided cith a Fâtimid embassy at Constantinople. The Emperor had agreed to release 400,000 ardabs of grain to famine-stricken Egypt, but before the grain could be shipped the Emperor died. Empress Theodora, who succeeded, was so alarmed över the Turkish invasion, that she refused to ship the grain to Egypt unless Egypt agreed to a complete defensive and offensive alliance. Egypt not agreeing to this, the previous agreement was annulled. The Fâtimids reacted by an attack on Byzantine Antioch but its commander Makin ad-Dawla Ibn Mulhim was taken prisoner along with a large part of his troops. However, the Fâtimid Caliph sent the Qâdi Abü 'Abd Allah al-Qudâ1 to Constantinople with a mission of peace in 447 / 1055. But Tughril continued his pressure. He requested by letter the reading of the gAbbâsid Caliph's Khutba at the Mosque of Constantinople, which was done. The Fâtimid envoy al-Qudâ" was humiliated. When he reported this to Cairo, the Church of Holy Sepulchre was sacked in retaliation. 109 These events show a persistent Saljüq effort to proceed against Egypt by first spoiling its relations with Byzantium and to make their long-standing alliances ineffective. Soon after Tughril declared, (in the same year) that he intended to proceed to Mecca for pilgrimage and then to the conquest of Fâ-timid Syria and Egypt. Fâriqî wrote a history of Mayyâfâriqin and Amid, a territory near Manzikert, but unfortunately he gives only a brief account, found elsewhere also. Kamâl ad-Dîn wrote a history of Aleppo, Zubda, and a biographical dictionary, Bughya. He uses earlier historians of northern Syria, whose, works are lost,'Azımı (48//1090 -d. after 557/1161). For our purpose his work is the most important, because Aleppo was the storm centre of the politics that shaped the events leading to Manzikert, because he gives certain pertinent information like a Fâtimid embassy at Manbij in 461 / 1069 which is not found elsewhere, and lastly because of his accuracy in mentioning details of names, places and dates conforming to a proper sequence of events. For Byzantine sources, the works of Laurent and Charanis (see index) sould be consulted.
Tughril had died childless. He had adopted his brother Chagbrî's adopted son, Sulaymân, and favoured him for succession. Mahmüd now wrote to Alp Arslân for help and read the "Abbâsid Khutba in Aleppo in 462 /1069. Baghdâd sent a mission to him under the Naqîb AbuTFawâris az-Zaynabî, gave him a robe of honor and the title al-Amir al-Ajall Husâm ad-Dawla. However at the approach of Alp Arslân, Mahmüd balked, but finally submitted. From now on Aleppo permanently passed into the 'Abbâsid sphere of influence.
About the Byzantine conquest of Manbij in 1068, Kamâl ad-Din reports: 122 "in 461 H. the King of Rüm marched towards Syria. He took much from the people of Manbij. its fortress was abandoned by its people, and he took it and re-inforced it with men, provisions and arms. Then he went to 'Azâz, 123 stayed there for a while and returned. God inflicted on him and his people draught, famine and plague. The king of Rüm said to the Qâdî al-Qudâ", the Egyptian envoy that he has suffered in one day the loss of 3,000 horses besides his troops. Itis said that Manbij remained in Byzantine hands for seven years. And the king referred to is Diogenes."
We know that Qudâ'î 124 had been sent to Constantinople as an envoy previously in 447/1055 by the Fâtimid Caliph Mustanşir in an attempt to patch up the breach of truce that had occurred, because of Byzantine refusal to deliver grain to Egypt as agreed. It was a sensitive mission. His choice now is indicative of a similar sensitive situation, when Alp Arslân was at Aleppo; the Emperor had returned to Constantinople and was in the process of equiping a large force prior to Manzikert. Our historian's mention of him in connection with the eonquest of Manbij further indicates a proximity of this mission to the developments that resulted in the Battle of Manzikert. The purpose of the mission is not stated. If it was in the realm of conspiracy and secret diplomacy could it ever have been known to anyone except the parties concerned? The secrecy was necessary for two reasons; first, if its purpose had leaked to Nâşir ad-Davla, it would immediately have been transmitted to Alp Arslân at Aleppo; second ,Romanus had certainly intended to take the Sultân by surprise, when he proceeded to Manzikert. Although we could not be certain about it, could we not suspect, or even expect a Fâtimid-Byzantine collusion in respect of the Byzantine attack on Manzikert? However, even if it was so, the Emperor was not doing it in the interest of the Fâtimids alone. He had been elected to his office precisely for the purpose of fighting the Turkish invasion effectively. But had this invasion resulted in the occupation of Syria and Egypt, how much graver would have been the plight of Byzantium ?
Again, the Fâtimid Caliph at that time was in no position to render material help to Romanus. His envoy therefore would have chiefly been interested in the strategy -the choice of Armenia as the battleground, and the city of Rayy as Romanus's announced destination rather than a frontal confrontation at Aleppo. Fâtimid diplomacy was interested in diverting theenemy which it could not fight. Common interests of Byzantium and the Fâtimids had evolved över a century, as we have noticed in this paper. At this particular juncture the realisation of a common danger was acute. The motivation was so strong that our inference would not be unjustrified.
Fâtimid diplomacy was effective in one important respect. It was the professed ambition of the Saljüqs to occupy Egypt. Both Tughril and Alp Arslân were diverted from it. After the Battle of Manzikert this ambition remained forever frustrated. But had the Fâtimids failed, the Crusades would either have been launched two decades earlier, or woukl not have been launched at ali.
